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“Now that oil is a commodity…” During the
past decade in Houston, many sentences have
begun with this phrase, often to explain how a
declining oil market has changed our city’s busi-
nesses, power structure, banking, real estate and
income. Morris Adelman is among the world’s most
respected energy economists, and in no other city
will you find quicker agreement with the thesis of
his new book—oil is a commodity, has been a
commodity throughout much of this century and
will be a commodity for a long time to come. His
book outlines the past and present implications of
this thesis.
In The Genie Out of the Bottle, Adelman denies
a special status to oil as a depleting resource or as
an increasing-cost good to be conserved for future
generations. He sets out to explain the turmoil
of world oil markets in the 1970s and 1980s that
resulted from OPEC’s gaining power over oil
markets, power that the cartel used clumsily and
with little foresight. He sees American energy and
foreign policy often based on the mistaken notion
that oil reserves were irreplaceable and would be
exhausted before the 20th century was out. This
book is an event-by-event economic history of the
last 25 years in world oil markets. It proves the
power of a market-based explanation of those
times, shows how U.S. policy often betrayed our
interests and points out what good policy might
have been. As Adelman aptly concludes, the chal-
lenge to world oil was and is one of oil abundance.THE ECONOMICS OF PETROLEUM SUPPLY
For some, the controversial part of Adelman’s
book will be his assertion that it is not useful to
think of oil and many other minerals as subject
to depletion over time. We can be sure the
doomsday environmentalist will bring different
ideas to the table. And within the economics
profession, there is a large academic literature
that deals with the optimal strategy for consum-
ing a fixed resource base over time. As we
deplete a mineral base, its price presumably
rises year by year because of increased scarcity.
Thus, supply decisions are different for miner-
als, as we have to decide how much to hold in
the ground today to take advantage of higher
prices tomorrow. Adelman bluntly suggests
economists find more useful pursuits. The earth’s
store of any mineral or hydrocarbon is neither
knowable nor fixed in any useful sense, he
claims, and advancing technology has only oc-
casionally allowed the price of a mineral to rise
for any extended period. Adelman builds a
powerful case that for recent oil history and for
many years into the future, the normal condition
of a competitive oil market is one of rapid
expansion of the reserve base under conditions
of declining cost. If price did not fall after 1970,
it is because of OPEC market power, not scarcity
or a threat of running out of oil.
Adelman’s view of the oil industry’s supply
problem is one of inventory renewal. The rule of
thumb is that the industry should hold about 15
years’ supply in the ground as proven reserves,
that is, recoverable at today’s prices and tech-
nology. The cost of reserves is strictly related to
the investment needed to find them, to drill and
complete the wells and connect to a pipeline or
tanker terminal. As with every other industry,
you will find the value of investment in oil by
discounting future revenues over time.
Crude discovery in the United States peaked
in 1930 with 13 billion barrels in reserve. Over
the next 60 years, and outside Alaska, inventory
turned over 10 times, and now 17 billion barrels
are in reserve. The geology of the United States
remained unchanged during these years, but
technology kept making reserves available. Most
of these reserves came from existing reservoirs,
not new field discoveries. Adelman points out
that the bread and butter of new oil supplies is
learning to delineate and exploit known fields,
and important technology has developed in this
market. From 1966 to 1977, for example, the
United States added 19 billion barrels of re-
serves, and 17 billion were from fields discov-
ered before 1966. In contrast, Adelman sees new
field discoveries for oil companies as analogous
to R&D undertaken by manufacturers—risky,
with highly uncertain results but with large
rewards for luck and foresight.
Adelman searches in vain for signs of global
oil scarcity. In 1970, as world oil prices hit their
all-time low of $1.21 per barrel ($4.45 in today’s
dollars), Aramco paid an excise tax of 88 cents
to producing governments and kept only 33
cents, but the company’s return on investment
was more than 100 percent per year. These
kinds of high returns provided adequate incen-
tives to invest further, and extensive plans were
under way to expand OPEC reserves and pro-
ducing capacity in 1970. Adelman finds the
long-run marginal cost curves for oil available
from noncommunist countries has shifted steadily
to the right and flattened out since 1955, telling
us that more oil was available each decade at a
lower price.
THE GENIE UNBOTTLED
The “genie” of the book’s title is the heady
discovery by the producing governments of
OPEC that they could control the price of oil.
Adelman sketches the end of the old oil re-
gime—the decline of the United States as an oil
exporter, the end of Texas Gulf Plus as the
world price of oil and the ascendancy of OPEC.
The key lever for OPEC was the ability to set and
manipulate a floor price for oil. The original
concessions with producer governments were
for profit sharing, and in 1948 Venezuela pushed
this to a 50–50 split. Oil companies posted a
price to determine revenue, subtracted produc-
tion costs and then divided profit.
Any decrease in the posted price by the oil
companies, which directly cut producing gov-
ernment revenues, came to be regarded by the
governments as a unilateral and regrettable de-
cision. By the 1960 formation of OPEC, the
unspoken agreement became that the govern-
ments would set posted price—regardless of
market price. The original tax on income be-
came an excise tax per barrel, as market price
could fall to zero and the per barrel tax contin-
ued. The world price of oil became “OPEC
excise tax plus,” in which the pluses entailed
operating and transportation costs. Tentatively
at first, then with confidence, OPEC found it
could raise the tax and raise the floor under the
price of oil. Prices might rise, but OPEC refusedto let them fall.
Using Economics 101 as a backdrop, Adelman
lays out OPEC’s problems as a cartel. Once in
the saddle, its first problem was to set a mo-
nopoly price, and the working rule is to choose
the closest substitute commodity and just under-
cut it. The cartel chose a figure far too high.
Adelman documents that neither OPEC nor the
consuming governments understood the long-
run elasticity of the demand for oil. OPEC tried
to set the price of oil just under the price of
synthetic liquid fuels from coal, shale or tar
sands, aiming at $60 per barrel or above. It
ignored the possibility of end-user conservation,
which proved slow to develop but which be-
came the primary challenge to the cartel by the
end of the 1970s. OPEC also ignored oil-on-oil
competition, failing to see the rapid and exten-
sive development of non-OPEC resources in
Mexico, the North Sea and Alaska. Combined
with end-user conservation, non-OPEC pro-
ducers taught the cartel the limits of its power.
Today’s $18 oil prices still include substantial
monopoly payments for OPEC, but at levels far
more modest than the genie initially seemed
to offer.
Second, and even harder, OPEC had to
manage production cuts and decide who held
excess capacity. In a competitive market, market
price and comparative advantage solve this
problem, as every producer operates to the
point where marginal cost equals price. In a
cartel, the producing governments collectively
win by withholding production, but incentives
are present—especially for the marginal pro-
ducer—to cheat and produce too much. The
burden of holding the line falls hard on the core
of big producers, the producers that can’t cheat
without hurting themselves, and in OPEC that
means Saudi Arabia. Adelman carefully docu-
ments how the allocation burden has shifted
within OPEC, first informally and then through
the quota system we see today.
RISE AND FALL
The rise and fall of OPEC and oil prices is a
story well known to any Houston audience
(Figure 1). Adelman’s book, however, is special
because it holds the events of the last 25 years
up against an unforgiving standard of basic
economics. As Nixon, Kissinger, Carter and
Yamani moved on and off the world stage, what
drove their view of oil? In retrospect, how could
they have been so wrong? Indeed, how could
we all have been so wrong? A number of
economists (including Adelman) have taken
credit for predicting the fall of oil prices in the
1980s, but Adelman can find only one formal
study that correctly predicted the oil bust. The
good news is that Houstonians and Texans were
not alone in their delusion about oil prices—oil
scarcity and unlimited price increases became
the perceived wisdom of the 1970s. The bad
news, perhaps, is that the only study Adelman
cites (and which was widely ignored) was by
three professors—George Daly, James Griffin
and Henry Steele—all then at the University of
Houston. If only we had paid attention.
However, if a villain exists for the expensive
errors made in world oil for the last 25 years,
Adelman chooses governments. Producer gov-
ernments went too far too fast in their demands,
often showing the short time horizon of un-
stable regimes. No matter how fast the money
came in, they spent it faster for consumption,
weapons and domestic subsidies. They proved
terrible businesses, never able to follow a basic
business plan. Meanwhile consumer govern-
ments felt trapped by looming oil scarcity. Price
controls delayed the conservation response
needed to combat high prices. American foreign
policy sought “special” relationships with the
Saudis, just as the French sought out the Algeri-
ans, in what Adelman claims was a mistaken
assumption that cultivated goodwill could some-
how bring down the price of oil. New supplies
and shrinking oil demand ended the myth of oil
scarcity, not diplomacy.
Figure 1
Boom and Bust in Oil Markets
Index: 1975 = 1.00 for all variables
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Houston energy companies were at the
center of a scramble to deliver heating oil and
natural gas to the Midwest and East Coast in
December and January. A series of winter storms
stressed energy distribution systems, which were
further hindered by mechanical and labor prob-
lems at some refineries, storms in the North Sea
and Gulf of Mexico and cold weather in Eu-
rope. Delivery generally proved reliable, but
energy prices rose sharply and then seesawed
widely as bad weather came and went.
RETAIL SALES AND AUTOS
The Houston shopper was the big winner
over the holiday season, as stores kept long
hours and offered tremendous markdowns. At a
time the city is experiencing good job growth,
the problem seems to be too many stores. None
of the big chains met its plan for the holidays,
and few matched 1994.
Meanwhile, November auto sales were up
16 percent from their year-ago level, resulting in
a record November for Houston dealers. Year-
to-date sales were up 6 percent over 1994.
OIL FIELD EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES
Demand for oil field equipment and prod-
ucts remains flat but at profitable levels, with
good prices and no inventory problems. The
year-end flurry of drilling activity that marked
many past years failed to materialize in 1995.
Respondents credited a combination of improved
management techniques, better control of capi-
tal budgets and the absence of expiring tax
credits to capture. Low levels of domestic drill-
ing onshore continue to be offset by high levels
of activity and rising day-rates for rigs in the
Gulf of Mexico. International opportunities con-
tinue to grow, especially in Latin America.
PETROCHEMICALS AND REFINING
Commodity chemical markets continue to
weaken, with production and consumption
down in the fourth quarter compared with
earlier in 1995. Prices and operating rates con-
tinue to fall. Despite the drop in operating rates,
inventories remain under control. Products closer
































ber—are performing better, with stable prices
and production turning up. Both gasoline and
heating oil prices began to rise in mid-Novem-
ber. The refining industry entered the heating
season with low crude inventories, partly to
save costs after several warm winters and partly
to avoid potential losses on inventory valuation
after the November OPEC meeting. By mid-
December, cold weather pulled crude invento-
ries below 10 million barrels, or 6.4 percent
below 1994’s level. In mid-December, large oil
product pipelines to the East Coast placed fuel
oil and other customers on allocation.
Gasoline prices’ November rise initially be-
gan with the shutdown of a large facility for
blending winter fuels. They continued to rise
as refinery capacity tightened due to potential
labor problems and cold weather. The result
was improving refinery margins through De-
cember, and refiners raised throughput to take
advantage of these profits. The price of crude
oil briefly moved over $20 per barrel, follow-
ing product prices upward.
NATURAL GAS PRICES
Natural gas is a local fuel, with its value
often determined by its access to market by
pipeline. Natural gas prices set records on the
New York futures market in December and at
the Henry Hub in Louisiana, where physical
settlement for New York futures contracts takes
place. Across the nation and the Eleventh Dis-
trict, however, gas prices varied widely, de-
pending on pipeline access to the East Coast.
While prices peaked at $3.50 or more in Louisi-
ana, prices at the Katy Hub near Houston were
close to $2 per thousand cubic feet. Prices in the
Rocky Mountains were closer to $1 to $1.50.
HOUSTON REAL ESTATE
Despite good job growth, respondents con-
tinue to report that local real estate remains flat.
The exceptions are quality warehouse space
and single-family housing. New and used home
sales continue to be strong, and 1996 may offer
Houston home builders their first chance in 10
years to enjoy both favorable interest rates and
local job growth.